

**Top Secret**

**USIB**  
UNITED STATES  
INTELLIGENCE  
BOARD

## Critical Collection Problems Committee

### *Intelligence Activities Against Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs*


Document not found in MORI  
04/08/04

**Top Secret**

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72  
October 1972

## WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



25X1

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72  
Copy No. 33 of 165

CCPC STUDY  
OF  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AGAINST  
NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

*October 1972*

25X1



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
<b>I. INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
A. Charge	1
B. Definition and Scope	1
<b>II. CURRENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE</b>	<b>3</b>
A. General	3
B. Middle East Area	4
C. South Asia/Afghanistan	5
D. Southeast Asia	5
E. Eastern Europe/Western Europe	6
F. Western Hemisphere: Canada and Latin America	6
<b>III. MAJOR GAPS AND INFORMATION NEEDS</b>	<b>7</b>
A. Major Gaps	7
B. Information Needs	7
<b>IV. MAJOR TARGETS AND TARGET AREAS</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>V. CURRENT COLLECTION CAPABILITY</b>	<b>11</b>
A. Human Resources	11
1. Overt	11
a. DoD	11
b. State	11
c. Agency for International Development (AID)	12
d. BNDD	13
e. Treasury	14
f. CIA	20

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72/2  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72  
REVISED

2. Clandestine . . . . .	20
a. DoD . . . . .	20
b. CIA . . . . .	21
c. FBI . . . . .	24
d. BNDD . . . . .	25
e. Customs . . . . .	25
3. National Security Agency (NSA) . . . . .	25
<b>VI. OPERATIONAL COORDINATION . . . . .</b>	<b>26</b>
A. Overseas . . . . .	26
B. Domestic . . . . .	27
C. Office of National Narcotics Intelligence . . . . .	27
<b>VII. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS . . . . .</b>	<b>29</b>
A. Background . . . . .	29
B. Law Enforcement vs. Intelligence Information Collection . . . . .	29
C. Operational Coordination . . . . .	30
D. Protection of Sources . . . . .	31
E. Use of Technical Equipment in a Foreign Country . . . . .	32
F. Requirements . . . . .	33
G. Law Enforcement Files . . . . .	34
H. Coordination . . . . .	35
<b>VIII. CONCLUSIONS . . . . .</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>IX. RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Appendix A</b>	
Information Needs . . . . .	43
<b>Appendix B</b>	
Executive Order Number 11676 . . . . .	47

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

**CCPC STUDY OF  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
AGAINST NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

**A. Charge**

On 31 January 1972, the Director of Central Intelligence requested the Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) of the USIB to conduct a review of intelligence efforts against narcotics, looking into such problems as "the coordination of collection, dissemination and production of national intelligence information on narcotics; the gaps in our knowledge of this subject; additions to, or adjustments in, resources allocated to this problem which might be made in order to fill these gaps; and to make recommendations for improvements in our overall intelligence on this subject." He requested the CCPC "to give particular attention to means by which better information on those trafficking systems which manufacture and transport hard narcotics into the United States can be developed."

**B. Definition and Scope**

1. In order that intelligence efforts be focused on those aspects which are of most critical concern to the U.S. Government, this study is concerned primarily with the so-called "hard narcotics," i. e., those which are addicting as opposed to merely habituating, although considerable attention is also devoted to cocaine because of the size of the problem which it represents.

2. A drug is addicting if it causes the abuser to be physiologically as well as psychologically dependent upon it. Other factors are the development of tolerance (the same quantity will not give the same effect over a period of time) and the irresistible urge to continue taking the drug. Of the drugs prominently involved in the international traffic, only the opiates are truly addicting. Cocaine and cannabis products, on the other hand, are habituating. In the use of these products, although psychological dependence develops, no physiological dependence is created. The opiates of concern are opium (raw), morphine base (intermediate) and heroin (finished product), the drug desired by the consumer, the addict.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

3. This study is concerned chiefly with the foreign intelligence aspects of the narcotics problem. It does not concern itself with domestic aspects other than the coordination and the distribution, retrieval and use of intelligence information, or with law enforcement other than intelligence support thereto.

4. It also does not specifically address the numerous on-going research and development projects in the narcotics field. So far, there has been no major breakthrough which can make a meaningful contribution to narcotics-related intelligence. This subject is under continuing review by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

5. A basic assumption of this study is that movement of opium products to the United States, as distinct from the flow to foreign markets, receives priority in intelligence collection and enforcement programs. It is recognized that ordering of priorities is a problem in those areas, such as Southeast Asia, where large "traditional" markets for opium and heroin exist. Trafficking and smuggling systems that move opiates to such markets must be closely monitored, because of their potential for diverting products to the lucrative U.S. market. Any system that deals in heroin for the U.S. market even as a sideline to its main activity of supplying "traditional" markets, is, however, a prime intelligence target.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

## II. CURRENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE

### A. General

1. Narcotics and dangerous drugs cover such substances as opium and heroin, marihuana, hashish, cocaine, morphine, amphetamines, and barbiturates. Intelligence support to narcotics control has focused primarily on developing information on illicit cultivation of opium poppies, on opium production, on the production and movement of opium derivatives, morphine base and heroin, and, to a lesser extent, the cultivation of coca and the production of and trafficking in cocaine. Little effort is presently directed toward traffic in the other substances listed. Heroin traffic control requires good intelligence on both licit and illicit production, distribution, and consumption of opium and opium derivatives. Our information on licit opium trends is believed to be generally good, chiefly because of international and national regulation of trade in that commodity.

2. The principal intelligence concern is the development of information on (a) the trafficking and smuggling of heroin, (b) the illicit cultivation of opium, and (c) the production of heroin. Much of the illicit heroin reaching the U.S. comes from Turkish opium processed into morphine base in Turkey, then processed into heroin in Europe and smuggled into the U.S., both directly from Europe and indirectly via Latin America and Canada. While our knowledge of illicit heroin is much improved over that of a year ago, critical gaps still exist in many areas. Our knowledge of illicit production of opium is generally good in three of the main producing areas: the Golden Triangle area of Burma, Thailand, and Laos; Iran; and Turkey; but ranges from poor to fair in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan and in Latin America.

3. Our intelligence on the movement of opium to processing sites, on the processing of opium into heroin, and on the eventual distribution of heroin varies widely. Intelligence on these activities within much of the Burma, Thailand, Laos area has been relatively good and is improving in regard to Hong Kong and Singapore. While intelligence on these activities in the Middle East and South Asia, Europe, and Latin America has improved, it remains inadequate for accurate measurement of quantities of opium and opium derivatives moving in the traffic and does not provide the information required for specific identification of smuggling routes and methods.

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

4. The cocaine problem has been secondary to the heroin problem to date. The areas of production, primarily in Latin America, are generally known, but our knowledge of output, processing sites and facilities, and distribution patterns remains inadequate.

#### B. Middle East Area

1. Current information on the many aspects of the narcotics problem in the Middle East varies markedly from country to country within that area. Because Turkey is generally regarded as the primary source of opium and opium derivatives smuggled into the U.S., we currently have more detailed, and probably more reliable, information concerning the problem in that country than on the other producing and transit countries of the Middle East. Even in Turkey, however, we have had to rely largely on official statistics and information from the Turkish Government. In many instances, this information has been confirmed by unrelated sources, and, at least in part, by U.S. Government officials—State, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), CIA, Agriculture, *et al*—who have traveled and observed extensively in the producing areas. Although there continue to be gaps in our information, especially concerning illicit production, illicit traffic, and underground elements involved, we believe that we have a fairly comprehensive picture of the current opium situation in Turkey. There is, however, little information available on—and no way of estimating—how much raw opium may be cached by the local growers, traffickers and smugglers and therefore available for future illicit traffic. If the Turkish Government ban on opium production is fully enforced and policed, illicit opium supplies could begin to dry up.

2. Next to Turkey, more information is available on Iran than on any other producing country of the Middle East, both on production as well as on trafficking. As in the case of Turkey, however, most of the information on production is based on government statistics. Iran, in addition to being a producer as well as a recipient of illicit opium to support the large number of local addicts, could become an important transit route for opium coming from Afghanistan and Pakistan on its way to Europe, although there is no significant evidence of this as yet.

3. One of the larger voids in our current information on illicit narcotics production and trade in the Middle East are the areas encompassing the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms. There have been recent isolated reports of opium transiting these areas, but further information is needed before any conclusions can be drawn. The substantial Indian production, which the Indian Government claims is tightly controlled, and Pakistan production could be a key source for any such traffic.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

4. Of the remaining countries of the Middle East, Greece, Lebanon, and Syria, and to a lesser degree Cyprus and Egypt, are important as transit and potential transit routes for narcotics. Israel and Jordan do not appear to be of major significance in the international narcotics picture at the present time except as transit countries for hashish and opium directed to Egypt and to a lesser extent, the Western nations.

### C. South Asia/Afghanistan

Information on Afghanistan and Pakistan remains somewhat more limited and of questionable reliability. We are dependent on the governments of these countries for statistics and have little opportunity to confirm or deny them. We have a more comprehensive picture of licit production in India. Here also, however, information on illicit production and traffic is sketchy, although information is available on the locations and extent of legal opium poppy cultivation in both India and Pakistan. The broader aspects of the production and addiction situation in India are fairly clear, in Pakistan are partially clear, and in Afghanistan are somewhat hazy. We do know that some opium is smuggled into India from Pakistan and Burma and that seizures of illicit narcotics are sometimes made in India. In a very general way the main smuggling routes are known as are the tribal groups engaged in illegal production in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

### D. Southeast Asia

We know in a general way the location of the areas of poppy cultivation and the routes for smuggling narcotics in Southeast Asia. We also know the ethnic groups involved in cultivation, the general locations of some clandestine laboratories, and some of the main smuggling groups. Refineries capable of converting opium into heroin exist in the Burma-Laos-Thailand tri-border area, in Bangkok and in Hong Kong. Most heroin produced in Southeast Asia is consumed in SEA or Hong Kong. Small but possibly increasing quantities of Asian heroin are sold to international traffickers and smugglers who move it into the lucrative U.S. market. Additionally, indications are that the Philippines are becoming more important as a source and as a transit country for heroin moving from SEA to the U.S. Large amounts of heroin were sold to U.S. servicemen in Vietnam in 1970 and 1971, but this market had diminished significantly by early 1972 as a result of withdrawal of U.S. troops and anti-drug programs in the U.S. armed forces.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

#### **E. Eastern Europe/Western Europe**

The pattern of movement and the main routes for smuggling opiates from the Middle East through Eastern Europe are known in broad terms. The principal areas of legal poppy cultivation are known, and a gradual understanding of the extent and character of the drug abuse problems in Eastern as well as in Western Europe is being developed. The probable transit routes through Western Europe are also known in a very general way. France is known to have a number of clandestine heroin laboratories in the Marseilles area. Warehousing facilities for storage of illicit drugs are thought to exist in West Germany.

#### **F. Western Hemisphere: Canada and Latin America**

1. Available information indicates that Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean area serve as major transit zones through which narcotics processed in Europe and Asia reach the United States. Mexico, in addition to serving as a transit area for narcotics, also is known to produce significant amounts of heroin for the U.S. market from domestically grown opium poppies. The principal locations of illicit poppy fields are in the mountains of western Mexico. Considerable information is available on the probable routes and smuggling methods by which narcotics are introduced into the United States. Opium is also known to be produced illicitly, probably on a very small scale, in other Latin American countries - Ecuador and Peru, and possibly Colombia and Bolivia. There is some indication that even heroin has been produced in clandestine laboratories in Ecuador.

2. General information is available on the illicit production and movement of cocaine from the Andean countries of South America to the United States. A rising tide in the abusive use of other drugs, particularly marihuana especially among the young, has been detected throughout the Western Hemisphere. Use of these drugs has stimulated greater concern in most Latin American countries than has heroin abuse, which is largely concentrated in the United States. Latin American enforcement capabilities are known to be inadequate and require improvement to cope with their own domestic drug problems, much less with the international problem. With some governments, national security considerations take precedence over drug control and enforcement.

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

### III. MAJOR GAPS AND INFORMATION NEEDS

#### A. Major Gaps

1. Major gaps in knowledge are those which constitute specific items of information essential to the penetration and abolition of a narcotics trafficking organization or the breaking up of smuggling organizations and operations. Specifically, these concern the "who" and the "how" of narcotics trafficking and smuggling. The narcotics traffic exists in a constant state of flux with ever-changing personalities, modi operandi, routes, methods of concealment, etc. As enforcement begins to make inroads, changes are implemented by the violators to escape enforcement action.

2. Specific gaps in knowledge concern the identification of those organizations or individuals who are the financiers, suppliers, chemists, laboratory operators, couriers, receivers, and co-conspirators; the supplies and raw materials obtained; the location of conversion laboratories; the routes used to transport contraband; the modes of transportation utilized; methods of concealing contraband; favored entry points; false documentation used by traffickers and smugglers; and those factors which tend to induce a foreign government to institute effective controls or actions to reduce or eliminate narcotics production and/or traffic.

3. All of these "specific" gaps are "major" when related to a particular investigation, organization, or system and some may become critical if enforcement is to be effected.

#### B. Information Needs

1. Information needs cited below are directly related to the interdiction of narcotics into the United States and are therefore considered critical.

a. *Information on planning by European traffickers and smugglers for developing alternate sources of supply of opium or morphine bases.* Our intelligence on the impact on the European traffic of Turkish curtailment of opium production may not be adequate for determining the adjustments which presumably must be made by traffickers and smugglers. The logical alternatives to Turkish supplies are India or Southeast or South Asian sources and to a lesser extent possibly Yugoslav illicit opium production. Whether or not traffickers and smugglers in Europe are also considering these areas remains unknown.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

b. *The routes and methods of smuggling narcotics from Europe to Latin America for eventual distribution in the United States.* Particularly critical in all countries are the identification of key groups and personalities controlling illicit traffic and possible official connections of the traffickers and smugglers. Detailed information is lacking which would permit more effective monitoring of the extensive airborne smuggling by private and charter aircraft -- location of clandestine landing strips, identification of aircraft and private (contrabandista) pilots, and of narcotics shipments by sea freight, and identification of ranking government officials who are involved in, tolerant of, or cognizant of local narcotics trafficking and traffickers.

c. *Location of heroin processing laboratories in Europe.* Although Marseilles is the principal processing center, there are indications that heroin laboratories have also been operating in such areas as Northern France, Belgium, and Switzerland.

d. As regards cocaine, the most important gaps in our knowledge concern *locations of processing sites in Latin America and the key individuals or organizations which smuggle cocaine into the United States.*

e. *The trafficking and smuggling systems that are moving opiates from Southeast Asia and Hong Kong to the United States.*

f. *Water traffic, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean.*

2. The below-listed gaps in information are less critical but nonetheless important.

a. *Identification of the wholesale distributing centers for opium and opium derivatives in Bangkok, Vientiane, Hong Kong, Saigon and other areas in the Far East.*

b. Both licit and illicit opium poppy and coca cultivation from which we can derive more reliable estimates of yield. *In most areas, including Turkey, we rely heavily on official government statistics. Information on illicit production is particularly fragmentary in South Asia and Latin America.*

c. *Transit routes and potential transit routes in Middle East countries and the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms.* Recent isolated reports suggest that significant amounts of opium transit the Sheikdoms, possibly from India.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

d. *PRC opium production, processing and illicit traffic.* The role of the PRC in narcotics activities is unclear.

3. A detailed listing of information needs is contained in the Appendix (page 43).

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP88B00365R000200050042-6

Next 18 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP88B00365R000200050042-6

TS 204206/72/3  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72  
REVISED

## **VII. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS**

### **A. Background**

Differences of opinion have long existed as to how best to attack the international drug control problem. Approaches to this problem have historically been law enforcement oriented. Since 1969, though, almost all agencies of the U.S. Government have been called upon to apply their resources to some facet to the problem. The consequent mushrooming effort on the part of agencies to which the narcotics problem has been in most cases an entirely new endeavor has been superimposed upon the traditional law enforcement effort, both in the U.S. and abroad. With respect to intelligence support to this effort, these differences have resulted in the problems discussed in the following paragraphs.

### **B. Law Enforcement vs. Intelligence Information Collection**

1. The lack of agreement in Washington is reflected in the field, where representatives of the different agencies involved are confronted with the practical problem of operating in a foreign country and trying to dovetail their varying types of operation. One of the major problem areas is the lack of understanding of the roles and modi operandi of clandestine intelligence information collection agencies and law enforcement agencies in support of law enforcement activities abroad. Basically, clandestine information collection agencies do not engage in law enforcement activities, and CIA has no law enforcement authority. On the other hand, law enforcement agencies such as BNDD and Treasury do engage in collection activities in support of their enforcement mission. Difficulties arise primarily from two areas: (1) how deeply involved in law enforcement activities collection agencies become in order to protect the sources of the information which they collect; and (2) how much detail concerning their collection operations must be furnished to CIA by enforcement agencies to enable CIA to fulfill its coordinative responsibility. These problems are compounded by the fact that U.S. Government agencies have no law enforcement authority abroad and must work with police and other appropriate officials of the host government to which they are accredited.



TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

2. Friction can also be caused by the different approaches to collecting information on narcotics trafficking and smuggling on which action can be taken. Although enforcement agencies collect in support of their enforcement operations, enforcement operations are their primary mission, and their activities are geared toward making arrests of traffickers and smugglers and seizures of illicit narcotics. Their operational environment is thus normally one of fast-moving, fast-breaking activities. Collection agencies, on the other hand, are geared primarily to the building up of a classic espionage network, which hopefully will lead to key individuals engaged in illicit narcotics activities. Their approach is thus a slower, more deliberate, painstaking one of careful development of sources over a period of time. This type development of sources not only occasionally hampers but is occasionally hampered by enforcement action, which, while neutralizing some traffickers and smugglers, can constitute a threat to sources of information on which such action may be based. Admittedly, it is difficult to know when to draw the line between making seizures now or forgoing seizures in the hope of developing information which will lead later to the principals behind narcotics smuggling and trafficking. These decisions are further complicated by host government involvement in the law enforcement action and by the need to prevent illegal entry of drugs to the U.S. market.

3. The differing responsibilities of the various agencies must be clearly understood if a major contribution to the collection of intelligence information in support of narcotics enforcement action is to be made while at the same time national equities, including the maintenance of a viable espionage mechanism and relationships with foreign governments, are to be protected.

### C. Operational Coordination

1. Another major problem is lack of operational coordination in the field among the U.S. agencies engaged in intelligence activity against the narcotics target. The purpose of such coordination is to assess the political, security or other risks involved in any proposed operation, as well as to ensure that all possible support is rendered to those engaged in such operations and that undesirable duplication does not occur. While some progress is being made in coordination between enforcement agencies and CIA, it is still a hit-and-miss proposition. The necessity and reasons for coordination are not clearly understood, and certainly coordination is not

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET


TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

practiced in all areas but is often dependent upon the individual spirit or personal rapport. Consequently, there is a tendency to disregard the formalities of coordination if it seems to interfere with "getting the job done." Operational coordination is especially important in countries such as Turkey, Thailand and Mexico where the national character and mood are sensitive to foreign interference, where westerners are objects of special attention from the local population, and where the security services are numerous and relatively resourceful.



25X1C

3. Many of these problems can be worked out if the field representatives of the agencies involved work together as a team toward the same goal. The narcotics country teams being established abroad should aid considerably in establishing the understanding needed among these field representatives and in the operational coordination which is essential to the successful execution of U.S. intelligence activities against the narcotics target worldwide.



25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP88B00365R000200050042-6

Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP88B00365R000200050042-6

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

25X1C

#### F. Requirements

1. Another problem area is the formulating and levying of requirements. So far the same collection requirements have been served on a number of agencies without regard to collection capabilities or to established procedures for the processing of national requirements. This has contributed to confusion as to who is responsible for what collection action and how and to whom information collected should be disseminated. Another factor has been the generalized nature of the requirements which has made collection guidance and targeting by collection agencies exceptionally difficult. It would be of material assistance to collectors if requirements for both overt and clandestine collection were continually updated and refined. Particularly with respect to requirements necessitating clandestine collection, concerted efforts should be made by analysts to make such requirements as precise as possible to enable the clandestine collector to conduct operations against specific targets.

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP88B00365R000200050042-6

Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP88B00365R000200050042-6

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72/2  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72  
REVISED

25X1

#### H. Coordination

1. The above paragraphs have discussed primarily the problems which are encountered in the field by U.S. agencies trying to combat illicit narcotics trafficking and smuggling. To a large extent, however, these problems stem directly from Washington where the whole effort should be pulled together. The complexity of the situation is compounded by the number and diversity of U.S. Government elements which are involved in some phase of narcotics activity. Some of these ignore or fail to understand the need for coordination and act unilaterally in furtherance of their own missions, some of which are disparate, some overlapping. And differences of opinion exist as to how and where their resources should be employed and as to who has the responsibility for certain actions in connection with illicit narcotics activities.

2. So far, of the various U.S. Agency actions against the narcotics problem more have been taken in reaction to ad hoc pressures than as part of a coordinated U.S. Government effort. An example of such ad hoc Washington action which has had continuing repercussions in misunderstandings in the field was a joint cable of 23 December 1971 which was designed to set forth the role of CIA in relation to BNDD and Customs in the narcotics intelligence collection effort, but instead left this open to varying interpretations and adaptations by the missions. Fuller staffing in Washington leading to more definitive guidelines would have prevented many problems resulting from differences of interpretation of this cable. Attempts have been made to clarify these differences, not only through numerous

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72/2  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72  
REVISED

cabled exchanges with the field, but also through regional conferences and innumerable TDY trips to the field by various personnel concerned. In some instances these trips have been helpful. In others, however, they have served only to hamper the effort further because of time consumed in briefings, conferences and escort duties.

3. Another Washington problem is that there is no central repository or data base of narcotics intelligence information. Nor has there been any place where such information can be collated and analyzed, except on an ad hoc basis, and translated into actionable intelligence. ONNI, which has been established to provide a clearing house of drug intelligence for Federal, State and local agencies involved in the drug abuse problem, was brought into being to solve this problem, or at least part of it.

4. From an intelligence point of view, there is no single mechanism through which the efforts of the intelligence community and other involved agencies can be coordinated. Although most agencies recognize the need for central coordination, no agreement has been reached as to how this could best be implemented. A central problem is the achieving of coordination without usurpation of individual agency and departmental prerogatives. A great need for an objective interdepartmental body which could monitor the narcotics intelligence effort abroad and ensure its adequate coordination is thus apparent. Such a body should be independent of parochial departmental and agency interests and be able to bring to bear on the problem all of the intelligence interests of the Government.\*

*\* The Director of the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence concurs in this paragraph with the understanding that the activity referred to is that which falls within the presently assigned coordinating responsibilities of the DCI and the USIB as set forth in NSCIDs and in statutory provisions.*

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

## VIII. CONCLUSIONS

A. Hard intelligence information on worldwide narcotics trafficking and smuggling is critical to the U.S. Government in its effort to combat the threat which illicit narcotics represent to this country.

B. While our overall intelligence on illicit narcotics activities is considerably improved over that of a year ago, many critical gaps still exist.

C. The problem of developing adequate intelligence on narcotics activities abroad will be a continuing one requiring sustained cooperative effort on the part of all U.S. agencies involved as well as of foreign governments for some time to come.

D. Although progress has been made in coordination abroad of the activities of those U.S. agencies concerned with some phase of narcotics information collection, there is still considerable potential for improvement in this coordination.

E. One obstacle to effective coordination both in Washington and in the field is the difference in approach and philosophy between the law enforcement agencies on the one hand and intelligence information collection agencies on the other.

F. Another deterrent to effective cooperative working arrangements in the field has been the lack of understanding of the necessity to protect sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, even to the detriment or exclusion of enforcement action.

G. Some of these problems could be overcome at least partially by the specialized training of BNDD and Customs personnel for overseas assignments, with emphasis on language, on area orientation and on techniques of collection and processing of foreign intelligence information, including debriefing and reporting procedures.

H. One of the major problems in collecting narcotics information is to identify the continually changing networks, key individuals, and methods involved in the movement of illicit narcotics. As law enforcement actions are taken, personnel, routes and methods are changed in attempting to evade law enforcement action in the future. Thus, targets may shift as rapidly as means are found to cover them, and new sources must be developed accordingly.

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72

I. The collection of information on narcotics is complicated by the lack of requirements specific enough to enable precise targeting for collection operations.

J. The handling and communicating of information on narcotics trafficking and smuggling must be discreet and of high security to avoid leaks to unauthorized persons and to reduce the unusually great personal risk to sources involved in the collection of intelligence information on narcotics.

K. There is a need for standardized techniques, procedures and formats for reporting both operational and substantive information to ensure (1) rapid and secure dissemination for action as well as for information, both in the field and in Washington, (2) inclusion in appropriate dossiers, (3) use in operational planning and targeting, and (4) keying of information to specific requirements.

L. There is a need for source registries in all posts where there is sufficient narcotics representation and effort to merit a narcotics country team. Additionally, these registries should include information on targets, requirements and priorities, as well as the record of coordination of collection effort.

M. There is a need to examine the feasibility of computerizing information, including classified information, on shipping manifests and on frequent or regular travelers to and from certain areas as an aid in the development of leads to traffickers, smugglers and routes.

N. Increased pressure to collect narcotics intelligence information has resulted in duplication of effort in some instances. Therefore, there is a need to determine that the required information is not available elsewhere or cannot be obtained by other means before a clandestine operation is mounted against a narcotics target or requirement.

O. The effectiveness of BNDD and Customs Special Agents is dependent to a substantial degree upon the rapport which they are able to establish with host government services as well as to the degree to which the host government is willing to cooperate. U.S. agents are also dependent in some measure upon other agencies working within the host country for technical information and operational support.

P. There is a need for continuing efforts to instill in foreign governments a realization of the seriousness of the drug threat, not only to the U.S. but to their countries as well, and to enlist their aid to a greater extent than is now the usual case.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72/2  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72  
REVISED

Q. There is a need to examine the feasibility of tasking overseas elements of the military departments to assist BNDD and Customs to a greater degree in their investigative roles abroad, particularly with respect to the involvement of U.S. military personnel in illicit narcotics activities.

R. The current proliferation of special and ad hoc bodies with various responsibilities relating to the narcotics problem has served to confuse the situation because specific authorities and functions are not as yet clearly defined.

S. The number and diversity of U.S. Government elements involved in narcotics information collection or law enforcement action abroad makes it exceptionally difficult for a clear picture to be formed at the national level of the overall U.S. intelligence effort against the narcotics target worldwide.

T. There is thus a need for an objective interdepartmental body independent of parochial departmental and agency interests to review and monitor continuously the narcotics intelligence effort abroad and to assess overall U.S. intelligence efforts against illicit narcotics activities.\*

*\* The Director of the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence concurs in this paragraph with the understanding that the activity referred to is that which falls within the presently assigned coordinating responsibilities of the DCI and the USIB as set forth in NSCIDs and in statutory provisions.*

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72/2  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72  
REVISED

## IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that the USIB:

- A. Approve the Conclusions in Section VIII above; and
- B. Approve the following recommendations:

1. That narcotics country teams (Narcotics Control Coordinating Committees) be established at those posts where they have not yet been established, where there are narcotics intelligence activities and where BNDD and/or Customs agents are assigned to the narcotics problem, and that procedures for effective coordination be arranged in each post.

2. That each country team coordinate the coverage of narcotics intelligence targets within its area of responsibility to ensure the most effective application of resources against these targets.

3. That these country teams forward through normal channels progress reports giving the status of action against specific targets, results obtained, problems encountered, and plans for the future.

4. That BNDD and Customs develop personnel with specialization in foreign narcotics intelligence collection operations.

5. That analysts dealing with narcotics develop precise requirements to assist the collectors in pinpoint targeting of intelligence collection operations.

6. That country teams be instructed to examine their overall security with respect to the handling of narcotics operational intelligence information; in particular, if open telephones must be used in a fast-breaking situation for the transmittal of such information, systems be devised so that this can be done without jeopardizing sources or operations.

7. That techniques, procedures and formats for reporting and filing both operational and substantive intelligence information be standardized as feasible and followed by all members of the country teams.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72  
REVISED

8. That BNDD and Customs representatives examine with CIA representatives the feasibility and value of analyzing BNDD and Customs investigative files to glean narcotics intelligence operational leads and targets.

25X1A

10. That BNDD, Customs, CIA and ONNI examine the feasibility of computerizing information, including classified information, on shipping manifests and on frequent or regular travelers to and from certain areas.

11. That the Department of State continue to encourage Ambassadors in those countries in which host government cooperation is deficient to seize every opportunity to work with appropriate levels of such governments to solicit their further cooperation in combating the drug threat.

12. That DoD examine the feasibility of tasking overseas elements of the military departments to assist BNDD and Customs to a greater degree in narcotics investigations abroad, particularly with respect to the involvement of U.S. military personnel in narcotics activities.

25X1

14. That BNDD, Customs and CIA develop a handbook with necessary translations for use by U.S. special agents and foreign police services in debriefing narcotics informants.

25X1

15. That the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control take the necessary action to have the United States provide the proposed \$250,000 additional grant to Interpol to enable that organization to expand its activities against illicit narcotics activities.

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TS 204206/72/3  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72  
REVISED

25X1

18. That the CCPC continue to review and monitor the U.S. narcotics intelligence effort abroad, to keep the USIB informed of the status of this effort, to determine additional actions which should be taken, and to make recommendations for the improvement of the overall effort.\*

C. Approve sending sanitized copies of this report, without Section V, to all country teams.

*\*The CCPC considered recommending that a USIB committee be established to foster coordination of the overall narcotics foreign intelligence effort, at least until such time as the mechanisms and procedures for coordinating U.S. activities abroad against illicit narcotics were firmly established and proven workable. In view, however, of the existence of the Intelligence Subcommittee of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC) Working Group, this recommendation was not adopted.*

TOP SECRET

TAB

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP88B00365R000200050042-6

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP88B00365R000200050042-6

TAB



TS 204206/72/2  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72  
Appendix B

NUMBER 11676

**THE WHITE HOUSE**

**EXECUTIVE ORDER**

**PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICE OF  
NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

This Administration is determined to eradicate the menace of drug abuse in America. Many steps have already been taken toward that end, including measures to restrict the flow of narcotics from abroad, to strengthen domestic law enforcement activities, to initiate programs for drug abuse prevention, education, treatment, and rehabilitation. I have now determined that a National Narcotics Intelligence System is a necessary next step in our campaign against illegal drug traffic, and that that system should be developed and maintained by a new office of National Narcotics Intelligence within the Department of Justice.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including section 5317 of Title 5 of the United States Code, as amended, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. (a) The Attorney General of the United States shall provide for the establishment within the Department of Justice of an "Office of National Narcotics Intelligence." This Office shall be headed by a Director.

(b) The Director shall be responsible for the development and maintenance of a National Narcotics Intelligence System. In developing that system; the Director shall call upon other agencies of the Government to provide him with information, and such agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Director with all information that is pertinent to the development and maintenance of a National Narcotics Intelligence System. The Director shall also call upon State and local agencies to provide him with such information.

(c) The Director shall be authorized to provide narcotics intelligence to any Federal, State, or local official that the Director determines has a legitimate official need to have access to such intelligence. These functions shall be performed under the general supervision and direction of the Attorney General, and the Attorney General shall delegate to the Director such authority as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order.

**TOP SECRET**

TS 204206/72/2  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/72  
Appendix B

Section 2. The Director shall cooperate with the Director of the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement in order to assist him in ensuring that all steps permitted by law are being taken by Federal, State, and local governments and, to the extent feasible, by private persons and organizations, to prevent drug abuse in the United States.

Section 3. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 11248 of October 10, 1965, as amended, is further amended by deleting "(13) Chairman, Price Commission," and by inserting in lieu thereof "(13) Director, Office of National Narcotics Intelligence."

Section 4. Each department and agency of the Federal Government shall, upon request and to the extent permitted by law, assist the Director of the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence in the performance of functions assigned to him by or pursuant to this order, and the Director may, in carrying out those functions, utilize the services of any other agencies, Federal and State, as may be available and appropriate.

RICHARD NIXON

THE WHITE HOUSE,

July 27, 1972

\* \* \*

**Top Secret**

**Top Secret**

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP88B00365R000200050042-6

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP88B00365R000200050042-6